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1. Since the completion of this Comment several developments have transpired
pertaining to Native American gaming within the State of California:
1) A general confusion pertaining to what entity has the authority to sign compacts at
the legislative level of state government. See generally Dan Bernstein, Wilson Signs Bill
Allowing Indian Video Slot Games, But Prop. 5 on the November Ballot Could Give
Tribes the Right to Operate More of the Machines, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Aug. 29,
1998, at AS (discussing the ratification of the Pala compacts, and the implications of
Proposition 5); Mary Lynne Vellinga, Tribes' Gambling Pacts Ratified by Lawmakers,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 28, 1998, at Al (discussing the legislative ratification of the
Pala and ten other compacts signed between California tribes and the State of
California); Tom Gorman, Judge Rules Wilson Can't Regulate Casinos, Gambling, L.A.
TIMES, June 26, 1998, at A3 (exemplifying the confusion within the State over who has
the authority to ratify tribal-state compacts); Sam Delson, Gaming Compact Challenged,
PRESS-ENTERPRISE, April 29, 1998, at A 7 (reporting that state legislators and gaming
tribes sued Governor Wilson in an attempt to overturn the Pala compact);
2) A general lack of consistency at the federal judicial level. See generally Christine
Hanley, Judge Says Government Can't Take Indian Gaming Machines: The Federal
Ruling Maintains the Status Quo While the State Continues Debating the Tribal Issue,
ORANGE COUNTY REG., July 23, 1998, at B6 (discussing the different approaches that
the United States District Courts are taking); David Rosenzweig, Judge Threatens Ban
on Slots at Indian Casinos, L.A. TIMES, July 21, 1998, at A3 (discussing United States
District Court decision to bar slot machines on reservation if a tribal-state compact is not
signed);
3) The addition of tribes which have signed compacts. See generally Viejas Band
Approves Compact to Keep its Gambling Machines, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., July 28, 1998,
at D2 (discussing the tribal feeling of duress to sign a compact or be shut down by the
United States); Chet Barfield, Barona Agrees to Adopt Gaming Pact, SAN DIEGO UNIONTRIB., July 24, 1998, at Al (discussing Barona's decision to sign a gaming compact);
Sam Delson, Five Tribes Sign Casino Compacts With Wilson, Tribes From Riverside and
San Bernardino Counties are not Among Those Agreeing to State Terms, PRESSENTERPRISE, July 14, 1998, at A3 (discussing the differences in the compacts and the
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referred to as the United States of America consisted of many cultures,
made up of hundreds of individual autonomous tribes, each a sovereign
nation with individual cultural traits including art, religion, language and
sociopolitical organization. 3 Early Native Americans are believed to
have moved to the North American continent through Alaska as long as
"twelve thousand to fifteen thousand years ago, and possibly long before
that." 4 The different Native American cultural groups were autonomous
tribes from first arrival until the time of the non-Native American
invasion. The impact the non-Native American invasion had on the
Native Americans changed the way of life for a diverse number of tribes
in many different ways, some of which will never be fully understood.
Life for Native Americans was also changed in regards to gaming.
During the period of time that Native Americans have inhabited North
America, gaming was an integral part of their culture. 5 Gaming was
initially part of historical ceremonial life which eventually evolved into
a bingo-type gaming that is now used as one type of economic
development for certain tribes who cannot depend on the natural
resources that were depleted by non-Native Americans. 6 The history of
Native American gaming has made the current gaming issue all the more
important in understanding the necessity of gaming for contemporary
Native Americans.
The purpose of this comment is to illustrate how the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act (IGRA)7 has compromised and is in contradiction to the
relationship between the United States government and the Native
American tribes of California, and what should be done to rectify that

feeling of duress to sign that the tribes felt);
4) Nevada's interest in Native American gaming in California seems to increase. See
generally Mark Henry, Nevada Casinos Ante Up Against Prop. 5. $900,000 was Raised
by June 30 to Fight California Initiative, State Records Show, PRESS-ENTERPRISE, Aug.
12, 1998, at A3 (discussing the effect that Native American gambling could have on
Nevada); Ira Teinowitz, California Casino Vote Draws Big Ad Stakes: 'Anti' Coalition
Seen Spending Up to $90 Mil, ADVERT. AGE, Aug. 3, 1998, at 16 (reviewing the
financial battle over Proposition 5).
2. The aboriginal people within the boundaries of the United States will be
referred to generally in this comment as "Native Americans" because to list the different
names of the separate tribes, and those tribes' cultures and traditions, would call for a
separate comment.
3. See CARL WALDMAN, ATLAS OF THE NORTH AMERICAN INDIAN (1985)
(providing a general historical and cultural overview of Native Americans).
4. ALVIN M. JOSEPHY, JR., THE INDIAN HERITAGE OF AMERICA 37 (1991).
5. See RALPH ANDREWS, INDIAN PRIMITIVE 59-61 (1960) (discussing Native
American use of stick games in tribal ceremonies).
6. See The History of Tribal Gaming (visited Sept. IO, 1998) <http://www2.
dgsys.com/~niga/ history.html>.
7. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994).
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relationship. 8 The comment will show that jurisdiction to control Native
American gaming on reservations, which was transferred to the states by
the federal government through the enactment of the IGRA, has
compromised the purpose of the IGRA itself, which is to "promote tribal
economic development, tribal self-sufficiency, and strong tribal
government." 9 State government jurisdiction is contrary to the relationship which has been developed between the Native American tribes and
the United States government, as exemplified by case law characterizing
the federal government as the guardian of Native American tribes, and
the protective purpose behind that relationship. 10
Part I will examine the general history of gaming within the Native
American culture, and what that history translates into for contemporary
California Native American tribes. Part I will also include a small
sample of a letter written to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs by the
Superintendent of Indian Affairs of California discussing the removal of
Native American tribes. That letter characterizes the mind-set of the
federal government during the time of peak infringement on Native
American sovereignty, and illustrates why gaming is one of the few
economic options available to some of the tribes of California. The
letter also demonstrates that neither the state nor federal governments
have historically considered economic sufficiency when removing tribes
from their land.
In Part II, the legal relationship between Native American tribes and
the United States Government will be defined by analyzing the language
of the Constitution of the United States, case law, and statutory law.
Upon analysis of the legal precedent, Part III will then evaluate the
IGRA to establish a better understanding of what the IGRA does, and
what the IGRA allows the states to do in contravention of legal
precedent. In addition, Part III will cite some examples of tribal-state
compacts from states other than California, and then fi nail y will take a
8. Only one Native American tribe in California has compacted with the state, but
the IGRA has worked to benefit tribes of other states such as Minnesota, Wisconsin,
Michigan and Connecticut. Native Americans on reservations in those states are building
new houses, roads and community centers. Where government programs have failed,
gaming has succeeded, taking Native Americans off welfare rolls and benefiting states
through increased tax revenues. See Tribal Gaming: Myths and Facts (visited Sept. 10,
1998) <http://www2.dgsys.com/~niga/myths.html>.
9. 25 u.s.c. § 2701 (4) (1994).
10. See infra Part II (explaining the history of case law and statutory law between
the federal government and Native American tribes).
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close look at the Pala compact, a recently signed compact between the
Pala band of Native Americans, and the state of California. Part IV will
show the benefits achieved by the Native American communities for
themselves, as well as the benefits extended to surrounding non-Native
American communities. Such benefits will illustrate that gaming is not
only beneficial for the Native American communities involved in
gaming, but also desirable for the entire population of the state of
California.
Part V will demonstrate the inconsistency between past legal decisions
and the IGRA, discussed in Parts II and III, while Part VI will demonstrate how attempts to resolve those inconsistencies could be handled,
and are being handled through State or Federal Constitutional Amendments, state ballot initiatives, the Secretary of the Interior's office, and
through the compacting procedure encompassed in the IGRA.
Upon analyzing the history of Native American culture, the relationship between the federal government and the Native American tribes,
and the current state of affairs on Native American reservation and trust
lands, Part VII will conclude that to enable the Native American people
of California to thrive once again, and to comply with the original
purpose of the relationship between the Native American people and the
federal government, Native Americans can, and must, be given the
opportunity to live as sovereign nations.
PART

I

SHORT HISTORY OF NATIVE AMERICAN CULTURE AND GAMING
WITHIN THE NATIVE AMERICAN COMMUNITY

Gaming in the Native American culture existed in North America long
before the arrival of Europeans.u Gaming, such as the game of
chenco, a game of sliding sticks and stones, is one of the oldest forms
of recreation, and was played in the Southeast United States, before
colonization. 12 Native American games were similar throughout North
America, with "two basic kinds: games of chance and gambling, and
games of skill and dexterity." 13 The games of chance and gambling

11. See Tribal Gaming: Myths and Facts (visited Sept. 10, 1998)
<http://www2.dgsys.com/-niga/ myths.html>. See generally WILLIAM BRANDON,
INDIANS 42, 136 (1987); DOLAN H. EARGLE, JR., THE EARTH Is OUR MOTHER: A
GUIDE To THE INDIANS OF CALIFORNIA, THEIR LOCALES AND HISTORIC SITES 38-39,

90 (1986).
12.
13.
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BRANDON, supra note 11, at 136.
WALDMM, supra note 3, at 50.
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included "dice, marked sticks, guessing games, and hand games," 14
Games in Native American culture such as stick games were played by
certain tribes throughout history, 15 Indian gaming was originally part
of tribal ceremonies or celebrations. 16 Now, however, gaming has
become a viable and acceptable source of employment and revenue to
some tribes who must depend on gaming in light of the fact that
European and American settlement "[destroyed] agrarian societies,
kill[ed] the buffalo and forc[ed] American Indians onto remote, desolate
reservations." 17 In order to overcome these travesties, gaming has
evolved into another mechanism used by Native Americans for survival,
cultural preservation and replenishing impoverished economies. 18
Gaming sponsored by tribal governments on a large-scale started in
early 1980. 19 Tribes in Florida and California began raising money by
operating bingo games at the same time the state lotteries began to
abound, but the tribes offered larger prizes. 20 The controversy over
official gaming started with the 1979 decision in Seminole Tribe v.
Butterworth. 21 The court of appeals in Butterworth upheld a federal
district court ruling that the Seminole Tribe of Florida could continue its
bingo operations despite the State of Florida's opposition. 22 The court
of appeals decided that the tribe could conduct gaming without state
interference because the federal government had never transferred
jurisdiction to the State of Florida to impose its civil regulatory laws on
Indian lands. 23 The crucial case, though, was California v. Cabazon
Band of Mission lndians. 24 In Cabazan, the Supreme Court recognized
the right of Indian tribes to conduct gaming without state interference.
One year after the Cabazon decision, the IGRA was enacted."'

14. Id.
15. See ANDREWS, supra note 5, at 59-61.
16. See id.
17. The History of Tribal Gaming, supra note 6, at I.
18. See id.
I 9. See The History o_f Tribal Gaming, supra note 6, at I.
20. See id. (illustrates that this was the beginning of state opposition to tribal
gaming that allegedly competed with the state lotteries).
21. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1981).
22. Id. at 312.
23. Id. at 312-15.
24. Cabazvn, 480 U.S. 202 (I 987) (holding that Congress did not grant states
express consent to apply state gambling laws to Native Americans on reservations).
25. See discussion infra Part III, contending that by enacting the IGRA, the federal
government has failed to protect the sovereignty and economic development of the
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Reflecting on the history of gaming in Native American communities
provides an appreciation of the predicament of California Native
Americans from the very beginning of their relationship with the federal
government through the treaty process. The analysis is important to
exemplify their necessary reliance on gaming at the reservations for
sustenance of their traditional ways of life and economic development
as they move into the twenty-first century. Historic documentation will
show that the treaty process effectively forced the Native Americans of
California to live where no one else wanted to live, and where sustaining
a livelihood would, at that time, be nearly impossible. 26 The removal
process consequently guaranteed the demise of many Native Americans
that were removed to the infertile areas, with no way to sustain life
through tribal traditions. With no other way to become economically
sufficient after removal, the tribes have struggled to survive economically, and culturally. 27 Through gaming, which is rooted in tradition,
tribes are again finally able to depend on traditional ways of life to
sustain their own lives now and in the future. 28
Historic documentation of the treaty process and the federal
government's capability of furthering the goal of tribal self-sufficiency
and self-government is one way to exemplify the United States
government's treatment of Native Americans. A telling report written
to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs Hon. L. Lea was submitted on
May 11, 1852, from E. F. Beale, Esq., Superintendent of Indian Affairs
for the State of California. 29 In the report Mr. Beale expressed his
views as to the merits of the treaties recently negotiated with the Native
Americans of California. 30 Mr. Beales' disdain for the Native Americans was obvious by his comments pertaining to them. 31 At one point
he refers to them as suspicious by nature, "although easily governed

Native Americans of California from state interference.
26. See ROBERT F. HEIZER, THE EIGHTEEN UNRATIFIED TREATIES OF 1851-1852
BETWEEN THE CALIFORNIA INDIANS AND THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT (1972)
(discussing the placement of Southern California Native American tribes).
27. See WALDMAN, supra note 3, at 201 (discussing the social conditions of Native
Americans on and off the reservations, including unemployment, poverty, and
alcoholism).
28. See infra Part IV (discussing the tribal benefits of gaming).
29. See HEIZER, supra note 26, at 19. A series of eighteen treaties were negotiated
with 'tribes' of California Native Americans by three treaty Commissioners appointed
by President Millard Fillmore and authorized by the United States Senate on September
29. 1850. However, on July 8, 1852, the Senate refused to ratify them in executive
session and ordered them filed under an injunction of secrecy which was not removed
until January 18, 1905. Id. at I.
30. Id. at 20.
31. Id. at 20-25.
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when [the Native Americans'] confidence has been obtained," 32 At
another point, he refers to them as "savages" who should not be exposed
to our citizens. 33
Mr. Beale continues to write of two important considerations: first,
"whether the Indians are to have any lands set apart for them," and
second, "whether those already selected for them may be justly
considered as suitable and appropriate." 34 The first question of whether
the Native Americans should have any lands at all, implies that if the
government could take away land without a major Native American
uprising, the federal government would not have reserved any of the
Native American lands for the Native Americans; instead, the United
States would have removed them by force or killed them off as had been
customary during the same period in other parts of California. 35 Mr.
Beale thought removal of the Native Americans over the Sierra Nevada
Mountains impossible, and therefore was forced to reserve some land for
them. 36 He found it equally impossible to move the Native Americans
north, for the population of Native Americans was already "overflowing"
in the north, 37 and moving them to the south would interfere with
European emigration. 38 Considering the difficulty in removing the
Native Americans from Southern California, Mr. Beale then gave a
telling commentary on the land reserved for them.
With reference to the character or quality of the land reserved by the treaties
for the Indians, I can only speak from personal observation with regard to those
selected in the southern portion of the State. They are such as only a halfstarved and defenceless [sic] people would have consented to receive, and, as
a general thing, embrace only such lands as are unfit for mining or agricultural
purposes. 39

He went on to say that "[t]he reservations made in the southern
portion of the State are undoubtedly composed of the most barren and

32. Id. at 20.
33. HEIZER, supra note 26, at 22.
34. Id. at 20.
35. See JOSEPHY, supra note 4, at 145. (He explains that between 1849 and 1859,
estimates showed that some 70,000 California Native Americans were killed by nonIndians, or wiped out by disease. Miners and settlers ruthlessly massacred the Native
Americans, and destroyed food stores during the Gold Rush).
36. See HEIZER, supra note 26, at 21.
37. Id. at 22.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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sterile lands to be found in California ... in no case of reservations
under these treaties, will the lands reserved compare favorably with the
agricultural and valuable portions of the State." 40 Mr. Beale's letter
illustrates very effectively that the federal government was neither
concerned for the self-sufficiency of the tribes, nor worried about
whether those tribes could or would ever become financially independent-a pattern which has apparently resurfaced through the grant of
power to state governments through the IGRA.
Because many of the lands to which Native Americans were removed
were generally considered uninhabitable and incapable of any type of
economic sustenance, the federal government had to choose whether to
help the tribes survive, or simply leave them to die. It would seem,
therefore, that given this history, the federal and state governments
would want to enable the tribes to do whatever was legal under federal
law to allow them to sustain themselves. The IGRA is one attempt to
accomplish this goal. Its purposes, as set forth in the statute, are to
promote tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal
governments. 41
Bearing in mind this history, statutes and case law are also enlightening to show where the relationship between the tribes, the state, and the
federal government stood in the past, before the enactment of the IGRA.
PART

II

THE HISTORY OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NATIVE
AMERICANS AND THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

The historic relationship between the Native Americans and the United
States government is important to demonstrate why state governments
should and do have limited power to regulate whether individual Native
American tribes may choose to involve themselves in gaming. 42

40. HEIZER, supra note 26, at 23.
41. 25 u.s.c. § 2701(4) (1994)
42. The author is aware that the treatment of Native Americans throughout history
by the United States government has been prominently negative, but the author is
choosing to focus on the positive relationship between the tribes and the United States
in order to represent that a positive relationship is not only possible, but is also in the
best interest of all parties. See generally VINE DELORIA, JR., & CLIFFORD M. LITTLE,
AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 15-21 (1983) (discussing the policy of
termination by the United States government toward the Native Americans from 19451961); see also FELIX S. COHEN. HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 152-80 (1982
ed.) (discussing the policy of termination by the United States government). See
generally A. DEBO, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES 349 (1970)
(describing termination as "the most concerted drive against Indian property and Indian
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Generally, state law does not apply to Indian affairs within the territory
of an Indian tribe, unless Congress consents. 43 This historical analysis
will also illustrate the jurisdictional powers that the United States
government has over Indian country. 44

A.

The Constitutional Bases for Protecting Native Americans

The Constitution of the United States makes one direct and two
indirect references to Native American tribes. 45 The direct reference to
the tribes is in the Commerce Clause, which gives Congress the power
to regulate commerce with the "Indian Tribes." 46 The first indirect
reference to tribes exists in the power of the President, with the consent
of the Senate, to make treaties. 47 Although no express language
concerning the Native American tribes was used, past treaties between
the United States government and Native American tribes exemplified
the applicability of the Treaty Clause. 48 A principle foundation for

survival since the removals following the acts of 1830 and the liquidation of tribes and
reservations following 1887"). See also WALDMAN, supra note 3, at 194 (discussing the
termination policy of the federal government where tribes such as the Menominee of
Wisconsin were terminated as a guise of freedom from government intervention, but an
underlying motive for various white interests and their allies in Congress centered around
the acquisition of timber on Indian lands).
43. COHEN, supra note 42, at 259.
44. The term "Indian Country" is defined as:
all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the
United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and,
including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependant
Indian communities within the borders of the United States ... and (c) all
Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished,
including rights-of-way running through the same.
18 U.S.C. § l 151(a) (1994).
45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; art. II, § 2, cl. 2.; art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. The
reference to "Indians not Taxed," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST.
Amend. XIV§ 2, is no longer relied on. See Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. I (1956)
(moving away from the idea that Indians are non-taxable, and relying on subsequent
statutory law).
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have [p]ower ... [t]o
regulate [c]ommerce with foreign Nations, and among the several states, and with the
Indian Tribes. . .. "). The Commerce Clause is the only express clause in the
Constitution which the federal government has used to justify its power over tribes.
47. See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate to make Treaties ... ").
48. Id. (The author expects that the reader will take 'judicial notice" of the fact
that in the past the United State has entered into treaties with Native American tribes).
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federal power over Indian affairs has been the Treaty Clause which
grants exclusive authority to the federal government to enter into
treaties.4 9
The second indirect reference to tribes exists in the power that
Congress has to dispose of and make rules and regulations pertaining to
property belonging to the United States. 50 The United States government holds Indian lands in trust; the United States government, therefore,
has the power to make rules and regulations pertaining to those lands
which Congress expressly reserved the right to control. 51 This clause
has been considered an additional source of authority over Indian
lands. 52
Not only does Constitutional language tend to show that the United
States government was aware that the Native American tribes needed
special protection, but the references to property controlled by Congress
also illustrates that the federal government needed to specifically protect
the Native American tribal land. 53 This language and provisions
demonstrate an assumption by the Framers that only the federal
government could provide the needed protection to the tribes. This
federalism is further exemplified in the case law and statutes in the
following section. As one commentator wrote,
Court opinions most often refer to the Indian Commerce Clause, [and] the
Treaty Clause ... in discussing the source of federal power over Indian affairs
.... For most purposes it is sufficient to conclude that there is a single 'power
over Indian affairs,' an amalgam of the several specific constitutional
provisions. 54

B.

Protecting Native Americans Through Case Law

In order to explicate how the courts have viewed the relationship
between the United States government and the Native American tribes,
a condensed examination of case law is helpful. 55 In Cherokee v.
Georgia, 56 the Court made clear that Native Americans were to be
considered "domestic dependent nations" under the protection of the

49. COHEN, supra note 42, at 207.
50. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have [p]ower to dispose
of and make all needful [r]ules and [r]egulations respecting the [t]erritory or other
[p]roperty belonging to the United States ...") [hereinafter Property Clause].
51. Id.
52. COHEN, supra note 42, at 209.
53. See supra note 50.
54. COHEN, supra note 42, at 208.
55. See supra text accompanying note 42.
56. Cherokee, 30 U.S. I (1831).
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federal government, 57 The case arose when the state of Georgia
enacted laws to divide Cherokee territory among several counties in
Georgia. 58 The newly enacted laws also invalidated Cherokee laws and
made any attempt of the Cherokee people to form their own government
a criminal offense. 59 Chief Justice Marshall determined that the tribes
were "ward[s]," and that the federal government was their "guardian."60
The Cherokee v, Georgia case launched the protective relationship that
the federal government would assume over tribes. One year later, the
Marshall Court put forth the proposition that states had no power in
Native American country. 61 Georgia authorities arrested missionaries
for violating a state law which required non-Native Americans to obtain
a license from the state Governor if non-Native Americans wanted to
live in Cherokee territory, 62 Chief Justice Marshall reflected on the
history of the relationship between the federal government and the
Native Americans and concluded that the Cherokees were not governed
by Georgia law, 63 and therefore the Georgia authorities had no power
to arrest the missionaries. 64
Another set of decisions protected Native American rights by setting
limits on the federal government's power, In Lane v. Pueblo of Santa
Rosa, 65 the Court found that the Secretary of Interior could not dispose
of lands claimed by a member of the Pueblo Tribe in the same manner
that he could dispose of other public lands, The case lends itself to the
argument that the federal government had a duty to protect Native
American lands.
Similarly, in Cramer v, United States, the Court upheld the federal
government's duty to protect Native American lands from encroachment
by striking down a statute that purported to convey certain legal
subdivisions of land to the Central Pacific Railway Company which
failed to protect the Native Americans right of occupancy. 66 The Court

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
(defining
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 17.
Id. at 7.
See id. at 7-8.
Id. at 17.
See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832). See also supra note 44

Native American country).
Worcester, 31 U.S. at 537.
Id. at 561.
Id. at 596.
Lane, 249 U.S. 110 (1919).
Cramer, 261 U.S. 219, 229 (1923).
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held that the statute "would be contrary to the whole spirit of the
traditional American policy toward these dependent wards of the
nation," 67 coming to this conclusion with reliance on "settled governmental policy." 68 In Williams v. Lee, the Court held that state law may
intrude on Native American tribes only where essential tribal relations
were not involved. 69 Essential tribal relations could be any act that
"would undermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation
affairs and hence would infringe on the right of Indians to govern
themselves. " 70 The Court stated that "absent governing Acts of
Congress, the question had always been whether the state action
infringed on the right of reservation Native Americans to make their own
laws, and be governed by them." 71 This line of cases determined the
protective role which the federal government was required to take when
states attempted to interfere with tribal relations.
The Court continued to treat the federal government as a fiduciary to
the Native American tribes. When funds which were supposed to be
paid to individual tribal members were instead paid to the tribal
government by the terms of a treaty, and misappropriated by the tribal
government, the Court held that the United States government has a
fiduciary relationship with a tribe, not simply a contract, through their
treaty. 72 Additionally, the Court, protecting the tribes in McClanahan
v. Arizona State Tax Commission, specified that state law could intrude
only if there was no interference with tribal self-government, and only
if non-Native Americans were involved. 73 The McClanahan holding
negated an Arizona state law which applied an individual income tax to
Navajos with respect to income derived from reservation sources. 74
The Court felt that state interests at stake must be sufficient to justify
assertion of state authority. These cases seemingly seek to protect

67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Williams, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
70. Id. at 223.
71. Id. at 220.
72. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942)
In carrying out its treaty obligations with the Indian tribes the Government is
something more than a mere contracting party. Under a humane and selfimposed policy which has found expression in many acts of Congress and
numerous decisions of this Court, it has charged itself with moral obligations
of the highest responsibility and trust. Its conduct, as disclosed in the acts of
those who represent it in dealings with the Indians, should therefore be judged
by the most exacting fiduciary standards.
Id. at 296-97.
73. McClanahan, 411 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1973).
74. Id. at 164.
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financial interests of the tribes and to assure continued economic
stability. 75
The fiduciary relationship rationale was further developed when the
federal government failed to properly manage certain funds held in trust
for a tribe, thereby breaching the fiduciary duty to the tribe. 76 A
district court quoted the Supreme Court's decision in Seminole Nation 77
when it defined the trust responsibility between the United States
government and Native Americans as having charged the United States
government with "moral obligations of the highest responsibility and
trust." 7s In 1976, the Court held that, contrary to Public Law 280,79
states did not have general legislative jurisdiction over Native American
lands, but rather only adjudicatory jurisdiction over contracts between
Native Americans on Native American lands.so Therefore, because of
this limitation in the state of Minnesota, Public Law 280 would forbid
an assessment of state and local property tax against personal property
owned by a Native American in Native American country.s 1
More recently, the Court went as far as to hold that the federal
government has a fiduciary duty to Native Americans, and that the

75. There have been subsequent decisions which could be seen as going against
this decision. See Strate v. A-I Contractors. 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997) (discussing that
when an accident occurs on a public highway maintained by the State pursuant to a
federally granted right-of-way over Indian reservation land, a civil action against
allegedly negligent nonmembers falls within state or federal regulatory and adjudicatory
governance; absent a statute or treaty authorizing the tribe to govern the conduct of
nonmembers driving on the State's highway, tribal courts may not exercise jurisdiction
in such cases).
76. Manchester Band of Pomo Indians, Inc. v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238
(N.D. Cal. 1973).
77. See supra note 72 (defining the trust obligation).
78. Id. at 1243 (quoting Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. at 297 (1942)).
79. Public Law 280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (extending state civil and criminal
jurisdiction to Native American land in five specified states: California, Nebraska,
Minnesota (except the Red Lake reservation), Oregon (except Wann Springs reservation), and Wisconsin (except the Menominee reservation)). Public Law 280 essentially
allows states to interfere with tribal jurisdiction when a law is criminal/prohibitory,
versus civil/regulatory. See generally Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Public Law 280 and
the Problem of Lawlessness in California Indian Country, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1405
(1997) (discussing the rationale behind Public Law 280).
80. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976); COHEN, supra note 42, at 177
("[T]he Supreme Court held that although [Public Law] 280 provided for substitution of
state for federal judicial forums over some subjects, it did not confer state 'general civil
regulatory powers' over Indian lands.").
81. Id.
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government should be liable for damages upon breach of that duty. 82
One can infer that the Court, in these cases, viewed the fiduciary
relationship between the federal government and the tribes seriously
enough to allow damages. The Court went on to hold that the Tucker
Act 83 and the Indian Tucker Act84 waived the sovereign immunity of
the United States for such claims.
In National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe, the Court
referred to tribes as sovereign nations which are free to act unless some
federal intrusion has affirmatively modified that sovereignty. 85 The
Court indicated that when there is a question of tribal jurisdiction,
federal law determines whether any limitation exists preventing the tribe
from acting, rather than whether federal law exists permitting the tribe
to act. 86 Therefore, the tribes were free to act unless prohibited by the
federal government. Furthermore, if the federal government is to
intrude, McClanahan made clear that any additionally assigned state
power could not interfere with tribal self-govemment. 87
The final example of the powerlessness of a state pertaining to Native
American lands is illustrated in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission
Indians which held that states were preempted from regulating tribal
gambling operations on reservations. 88 California assumed criminal
jurisdiction over Indian reservations under Public Law 28089 before the
law was amended to require the tribes' consent. California therefore
threatened to apply criminal sanctions against the Cabazon and Morongo
Bands of Mission Indians when they opened a bingo hall and card hall
at which casino-type card games were played. 90 The tribes sought a
declaratory judgment stating that California had no power to apply its
statutes on the reservation, and the district court granted the tribes'

82. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 226 (1983).
83. 28 u.s.c. § 1491 (1948).
The United States Claims Court shall have jurisdiction to render judgment
upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution,
or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon
any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or
unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.
Id. § 149l(a)(l).
84. 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (1949) (providing tribal claimants the same access to the
Court of Claims provided to individual claimants by 28 U.S.C. § 1491).
85. National Farmers, 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
86. Id. at 852-53.
87. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 181 (1973).
88. Cabazon, 480 U.S. 202 (1987). The case was brought in a Public Law 280
state and therefore application of the case may be limited to states utilizing Public Law
280.
89. See supra note 79.
90. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 205.
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motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the decision as did the Supreme Court. 91
The Supreme Court in Cabazon allowed tribes to conduct casino-style
gaming as well as bingo. 92 The Court rejected California's argument
that its bingo statute was a criminal law. Instead, the Court found "that
California regulates rather than prohibits gambling in general and bingo
in particular, since California permits a substantial amount of gambling
activity, including bingo, and actually promotes gambling through its
state lottery." 93 Therefore, the majority decided that since California
regulated rather than prohibited gambling, the state was prevented from
asserting its jurisdiction over the tribes' gaming activities. 94 One year
after the Cabazon decision, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act was
passed.
PART III
THE INDIAN GAMING REGULATORY ACT (IGRA) 95
The phrase within the United States Constitution that states that "[t]he
Congress shall have the [p]ower ... [t]o regulate [c]ommerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian
Tribes," 96 codifies the United States government's sole responsibility
for trade with the Native American tribes.
Article II, section two, clause two states that, "[the President] shall
have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
Treaties ... " 97 a power that has been exercised throughout history. 98
In addition, the language in Article IV, section three, clause two- "The
Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and

91. Id. at 202-03.
92. Id. at 221.
93. Id. at 210.
94. Id.
95. See generally Michael D. Cox, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: An
Overview, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 796 (1994) (an extensive overview of the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act).
96. See supra note 45, art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
97. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
98. See generally DA YID H. GETCHES, ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 83 (] 993)
(discussing treaties generally).
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Regulations respecting the [t]erritory or other [p]roperty belonging to the
United States ... " 99 -furthers the intent of the United States government to control all "the territory," impliedly grants Congress power to
regulate Native Americans on Native American lands. 100
In addition to the United States Constitutional references to Native
American tribes, the voluminous case law 101 unequivocally relies on
Congress, not the states, to regulate Native Americans on Native
American lands. That same case law has made equally clear that states
do not have the power to regulate Native Americans on Native American
land, when there is no mention of states having any power over Native
Americans in the Constitution. 102 To the contrary, in McClanahan, in
order for a state to justify an assertion of state authority, there had to be
a lack of interference with tribal self-government, and non-Native
Americans must be involved. 103 Why then would Congress give the
states powers that are inconsistent with past law, such as those encompassed in the IGRA? 104
The IGRA divides gaming into three classes. 105 Class I includes
"social games solely for prizes of minimal value or traditional forms of
Indian gaming engaged in by individuals as a part of, or in connection
with, tribal ceremonies or celebrations." 106 Class I gaming is regulated
by the tribe. 107 Class II games include bingo played for prizes or
money, pull-tabs, lotto, punch boards, tip jars, instant bingo, and other
games similar to bingo, if the games are played in the same location of
the bingo games. 108 Class II also includes card games that are authorized by state law or not prohibited by state law, which must be played
in conformity with those laws as to hours of operation and pot sizes. 109
Class II is problematic because IGRA mandates that Class II games be
authorized by state law; therefore, state laws which allow card rooms in
California, allow tribes to have card rooms on reservations. 110 Finally,

99. See supra note 45, art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
100. COHEN, supra note 42, at 209.
101. See supra Part II.
102. See generally Public Law 280, supra note 79 (Public Law 280 only gives the
state power to prohibit criminal acts, if the state prohibits those acts criminally, not the
power to regulate civil acts). See also California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,
480 U.S. 202, 210 (1987) (discussing California's allowance of lotteries, parimutuel
gambling and bingo)
103. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164.
104. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994).
105. Id.
106. See id. § 2703( 6 ).
107. See id. § 27JO(a)(i).
108. See 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(A)(i)(I-III) (1994).
109. See id. § 2703(7)(A)(ii)(I-II).
I JO. See id. § 2710(b)(l).
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Class III games, the most controversial class, encompass all forms of
gambling not listed in Classes I or II, 111 such as lotteries, parimutuel
wagering, 112 casino games, slot machines, electronic facsimiles of
games of chance and banking card games. Class III games not only
have to meet the same requirements as Class II gaming, but, completely
contrary to the historical relationship between the state government and
the tribes, the states and the tribes are required to form a compact
essentially giving a state regulatory control of whether a tribe can enter
into the most profitable class of gaming. 113 In California, for example,
Governor Wilson and Attorney General Dan Lungren have decided to
disallow electronic gaming on reservation casinos, while allowing
electronic lottery games in the state. 114
The motivations of Congress in giving the states such great power are
contained in the "findings" section of the IGRA, 115 where Congress
expressed concern with the revenue-producing aspects of tribal gaming,
the federal government's ability to review contracts related to the
gaming, as well as the federal government's lack of clear standards or
regulations involving gaming. 116 In the past, tribes regulated gaming
activities by their own police powers, taking violators to court when
necessary. 117 Congress also set forth the principal goal of federal
Native American policy to "promote tribal economic development, tribal
self-sufficiency, and strong tribal government." 118 In an attempt to
clarify the relationship between the federal government and the Native
Americans, the section provides that, "Indian tribes have the exclusive
right to regulate gaming activity on Indian lands if the gaming activity
also must not specifically prohibited by Federal law." 119 However, the
section continues and is inconsistent with past case law, past federal
111. See id. § 2703(8).
112. Parimutuel is "a system of betting on races in which those backing the winners
divide, in proportion to their wagers, the total amount bet, minus a percentage for the
track operators, taxes etc. 2. [A] machine for recording such bets and computing payoffs;
totalizator", WEBSTERS NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 1033
(2d College ed. 1982).
113. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (1994).
114. Alan Bersin, Resolving the Indian Gaming Problem, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
June 26, 1996, at B7.
115. See 25 U.S.C. § 2701 (1994).
116. See id. § 2701(1-3).
117. See supra note 19.
118. See 25 U.S.C. § 2701(4) (1994).
119. See id., § 270 I (5).
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policy, as well as clause IV of the same section, by stating that the
gaming activity also must not violate state law or public policy. 120 By
passing the IGRA in its current form, the federal government has
ignored the historical problems between states and tribes. 121 Additionally, the federal government has assumed that the promotion of tribal
sovereignty could be accomplished by giving states the right to regulate
reservation activity, which is the heart of tribal self-sufficiency, and
strong tribal government.
The next pertinent section is the "Declaration of Policy" section,
which explains the purpose of the IGRA. 122 The first clause is selfexplanatory: "to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by
Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development, selfsufficiency, and strong tribal governments." 123 The second clause
notions protecting the tribe from organized crime and other outside
influences which could divert funds from the tribe, or hinder the fair and
honest operation of the gaming industry on tribal lands. 124 The fear
of organized crime was cited by concerned states despite Sen. McCain
testifying that "[b]oth the Department of Justice and the FBI have
repeatedly testified before the Committee on Indian Affairs and have
indicated that there is not any substantial criminal activity of any kind
associated with Indian gaming." 125 This testimony should put any
fears of criminal activity to rest. In the third and final clause, Congress
asserts authority to establish laws, and establishes the National Indian
Gaming Commission for the protection of gaming as a means of
generating tribal revenue. 126 Nowhere in the purpose section does
Congress address state authority, having only provided the federal
government power over Indian lands. Since the IGRA allows states to
compact with tribes, some benefits to certain tribes may be obtained if
the compacting agreements are made through good faith, arms-length
negotiations.

120. Id.
121. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 515 (1832) (generally discussing how the
state of Georgia treated the Cherokee people).
122. See 25 U.S.C. § 2702 (1994).
123. See id. § 2702(1).
124. See id. § 2702(2).
125. 140 CONG. REC. Sl4, 729-30 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1994) (statement of Sen.
McCain).
126. See 25 U.S.C. § 2702(3) (1994).
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A.

State Governor and Legislative Treatment of the
IGRA in Other States

Governors from across the country have demonstrated successful
leadership pertaining to the Native American gaming issue. 127 Governor Lowell Weicker of Connecticut granted two Native American tribes
a casino monopoly, after getting support from local governments. 128
"The Pequot Tribe [through the compacting process] promised the state
25 percent of casino income or a minimum of $100 million annually for
so long as it was granted a statewide monopoly." 129 Governor Finney
of Kansas vetoed a bill that would have outlawed all casino gambling. 130 Governor Finney felt that the bill blatantly discriminated
against Native American people. 131 Governor Finney finally negotiated
a compact with the Kickapoo Nation authorizing a large-scale casino,
although the Attorney General of Kansas argued that the Governor
lacked authority to establish a compact, because a compact was law
requiring legislative approval. 132 The Kansas Supreme court agreed,
and held that legislative approval was required in the compacting
process. 133
In Arizona, Governor Symington and Secretary of the Interior Bruce
Babbitt, compromised with two tribes in Arizona to allow certain
amounts of Las Vegas-style slot-machines, putting a cap of four hundred
machines for smaller tribes, and thirteen hundred for larger tribes. 134
This compact was agreeable to both the Governor, and the tribes, but the
state legislature refused to repeal a ban on casinos as agreed upon in the
compact, which hindered the entire process. 135
Questions about who has the power under the IGRA to compact, the
legislature or the Governor, whether states should have the power, and

127.
Defining
16.
128.
129.
130.

131.
132.
I 33.
134.
135.

Don F. Hadwiger, State Governors and American Indian Casino Gambling:
State-Tribal Relationships, SPECTRUM: THE J. OF STATE GOVT., Fall 1996, at
Id. at 20.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hadwiger, supra note 127, at 21.
Id.
Id. at 22.
Id.
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whether it makes sense not to compact, continue to cloud the IGRA.
The above examples characterize state confusion as to who can even
sign the compact, and if compacting with one tribe is sufficient as
pertaining to other tribes that may be a different size, or in a different
location, which is all the more reason to leave the decisions in the hands
of the tribes themselves.

B.

The Pala Compact

A current example of the confusion that state compacts bring about,
and the animosity that develops between the state and tribes, and
between different tribes, is exemplified in the only compact that
Governor Pete Wilson of California has been willing to negotiate, the
"Pala compact." 136 Governor Wilson decided that he would finally
compact with a small non-gaming tribe in Southern California. 137
After negotiating for seventeen months, a token compact was signed on
March 8, 1998, allocating a pool of electronic gaming devices to each
of California's tribes. 138
The compact allocates 19,900 gaming devices to each of the 104
California tribes. 139 The allocation will allot each tribe one hundred
and ninety-nine games, with the ability of remote non-gaming tribes to
sell their allotments for $5,000 a game per year to gaming tribes. 140
The agreement also allows the state to enforce state and local land-use
planning standards, labor standards, and environmental standards on
reservation lands. 141 It will require tribes to reach agreement with
county officials on mitigation of public health and safety effects,
building standards and environmental impact caused by gambling outside
the boundaries of a reservation. 142 In addition, the compact would
allow advisory votes by cities and counties that could effectively result
in the re-negotiation of a compact. 143 The compact also forces tribes
to give employees state workers compensation protection, state
136. James P. Sweeney, Wilson, Tribe to Sign Pact on Gaming: Pala Deal
Designed as a State Model, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 6, 1998, at A3 [herinafter
State Model]. See generally Robert Smith and Paula Lorenzo, Exercising Sovereignty
Does Not Undermine It. SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 13, I 998, at BS (tribal leaders
voicing displeasure with other tribes opposition to the Pala compact).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. James P. Sweeney, Governor, Pala Indians Agree on Gaming Pact: Other
Tribes Get Deadline to Sign Up or Negotiate, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 7, 1998,
at A I [hereinafter Deadline].
140. Id.
141. Sweeney, State Model, supra note 136.
142. Sweeney, Deadline, supra note 139.
143. Id.
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unemployment insurance, and disability insurance, as well as g1vmg
employees the right to collective bargaining if they agree not to
strike. 144 All tribes, whether involved in the compacting process or
not, must agree to enter into a compact identical to the Pala compact, or
shut down all existing machines, and go to the bargaining table with the
state, who would then waive its constitutional immunity from lawsuits
over bad-faith bargaining. 145
This particular agreement caused some alarm within the Native
American community during the negotiation period. 146 Tribal Chairman Anthony Pico of the Viejas tribe expressed his concern that his tribe
was not involved with the negotiations and that the Pala tribe has no
right to negotiate concessions for other tribes. 147 He went on to state
that what may be a good agreement for Pala may "bankrupt" the Viejas
tribe. 148 The compact between Wilson and Pala will cause problems
between the tribes, forcing them to fight each other for the limited
devices. 149
This compact could effectively create internal tribal
divisions, as well as divisions between the tribes, an outcome that
ironically may be a boon to Wilson who is acutely aware of the $20
million fund which gaming tribes have accumulated to campaign for
legalization of the electronic games in question. 150 The concern
expressed during the negotiations for the compact came to light just
three days after the compact was signed. 151 Thirty-two of the thirtynine gaming tribes rejected the Pala compact. 152 Daniel Tucker,
chairman of the California Nevada Indian Gaming Association, referring
to the states compact, stated, "[t]hey've put us in a situation where it's

144.
Al.
145.

What the Gaming Compact Does, SAN DIEGO UN!ON-TRIB., Mar. 7, 1998, at

Chet Barfield, Governor, Pala Indians Agree on Gaming Pact: State's Pact
With Pala May Have Dealt Some Casinos a Losing Hand, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
Mar. 7, 1998, at Al.
146. James P. Sweeney & Chet Barfield, Pala Gaming Deal with State Near at
Hand; Landmark Compact Stirs Controversy Among Tribes, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
Feb. 8, 1998, at A 1.
147. Id.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id.
Id.
Sweeney, State Model, supra note 136.
James P. Sweeney, Indian Alliance Rejects State's Gambling Pact: Tribes Gird
for Fight Over Ballot Initiative, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 11, 1998, at Al
[herinafter Alliance Rejection].
152. Id.
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almost like they want to divide and conquer us again. . . . We're not
going to be divided and conquered anymore." 153 Tucker and Mary
Ann Andreas, tribal chair of the Morongo Tribe, voiced concern that
most tribes were being asked to accept a compact that they were largely
excluded from, after promises were broken relating to being kept
informed of continuing negotiations and being given the opportunity to
ratify the compact. 154 They also related their concerns about the
incursion on tribal sovereignty that the 19,900 machine cap will
cause. 155 Six days after the signing of the compact, Chairman of the
Viejas tribe, Anthony Pico, voiced his concern pertaining to the control
that the compact gives to cities and counties. 156 Chairman Pico is
willing to work with the county, but only on a government to government basis. 157
Mike Connolly, environmental director and tribal council officer for
the Campo Indian Band, stated that because the compact would subject
tribes to the California Environmental Quality Act, the tribes land-use
and planning decisions would be under the state's jurisdiction. 158 This
is a disconcerting proposition when historically local governments have
shown tribal governments little respect in the area of land management
and planning. 159 For example, when hearings were held designating
Highway 94 as a scenic highway, two miles of which are on the Campo
reservation, Campo representatives were not even invited. 160 In
another instance of tribal-local government relations, the tribe was never
consulted when a waste-transfer station was placed right next to the
Campo reservation. 161
Tribal entities are not the only ones concerned about the Pala compact.
County Supervisor Dianne Jacob realizes that tribes have been treated
unfairly in the past, and stated that it was unfortunate that tribes were
left out of the Pala compact bargaining agreement. 162

153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Chet Barfield, Indians Say Gaming Pact Usurps Their Sovereignty, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Mar. 14, 1998, at Al [herinafter Sovereignty Usurption]. But see Chet
Barfield, Pala Tribe Defends Gambling Compact; Eighteen Page Document Rebuts
Criticism Point by Point. SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 28, 1998, at B3 [hereinafter
Rebuttal].
157. See Barfield, Sovereignty Usurption, supra note 156.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Barfield, Sovereignty Usurption, supra note 156.
162. Id.
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What this compact appears to be is an agreement with a non-gaming
tribe, agreeing to the use of a small number of machines, which are still
in development and may not be available for months, 163 The machines
are being called an instant lottery device, and are being developed by a
company in Reno, Nevada, 164 The machines will have gamblers play
against each other, instead of playing against the house, as do the
existing video slots, 165 This type of agreement is anything but a "good
faith" negotiation or all tribes would have been comfortable coming to
the negotiation table, and Wilson would not be attempting to force the
compact on all tribes statewide, George Forman, an attorney for the
Sycuan band of Native Americans, describes the individual sovereignty
that tribes hold apart from one another, when he states, "[t]he state of
California would not blindly accept something the state of Colorado
negotiated," 166 If any interference is to take place it should only be by
the federal government States should take a step back, and look at the
positive benefits that tribal gaming could, and does, bring to them,
PART IV

THE BENEFITS OF NATIVE AMERICAN GAMING OPERATIONS TO
TRIBES AND TO SURROUNDING CALIFORNIA NON-NATIVE AMERICAN
COMMUNITIES

Native American gaming has had a positive effect on the lives of
Native American people on reservations, and also benefitted the lives of
non-Native Americans in surrounding communities,
A,

The Effect of Gaming on Native American Reservation Life

Economic success can have a positive effect on every aspect of life,
Economic development due to gaming improves community services, the
quality of education and health services, and allows for the development

163.
164.
165.
166.

Sweeney, State Model, supra note 136.
Sweeney, Deadline, supra note 139.
Id.

Sweeney & Barfield, supra note 146.
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of infrastructure including investments into non-gaming industry. 167
"The principle objective is to encourage new business ventures and jobs
by expanding player alternatives to gambling." 168 Tribes have delved
into such businesses as golf courses and hotels to accomplish economic
development. 169 Some community leaders have realized that reservation gaming is good for the tribes. In a 1995 article, Republican Jan
Goldsmith, assemblyman from the 75th District of California, stated that
the tribes gaming has reduced their "traditionally high unemployment
rates to zero, thus freeing many of their members from the public
assistance rolls and the public from the tax burden to support them." 170
At the time Mr. Goldsmith wrote his article, the tribes had already spent
$4.5 million for roads, education, housing, health care, fire protection
and related social services for their members. 171 Mr. Goldsmith
succinctly stated that, "[r]eservation gaming has empowered tribes to
become full members of the larger community while retaining their
sovereignty and unique heritage." 172 Lawmakers from across the state
of California realize that the Native American "gambling operations
provide jobs and revenue for Indian tribes, which are consistently one of
the poorest segments of society, and for the surrounding areas." 173
Additionally, the gaming industry has also facilitated a university
degree program in gaming at D-Q University, California's Native
American community college. 174 The program was the idea of Paula
Lorenzo who noticed the small numbers of Native American managers
on the floor of the Rumsey Rancherias Central Valley casino. 175 The
goal of the program is to teach Native Americans more about the gaming
industry, and to better understand, develop, and manage tribal gaming. 176 One student at D-Q felt that in addition to giving tribal
members the opportunity to learn more about the industry, the further
education of casino management could help avoid the bitter disputes that

167. Gary C. Anders, The Indian Gaming Regulaton Act and Native American
Development, 6 INT'L POLICY REV. 84-86 (1996).
168. Id. at 85.
169. Id.
170. Jan Goldsmith, Tribal Gaming is Good for Everyone, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
Oct. 26,
171.
172.
173.

1995, at B 15.

Nov. 23,
a Native
175.
176.

1997, at A3 (D-Q University provides Native American language classes, and
American-centered curriculum).

Id.
Id.

David Safford, Lawmakers Question Wisdom of Order to Pull Plug on
Electronic Gambling, LEGI-SLATE NEWS SERVICE, April 21, 1997, at I.
174. Bill Ainsworth, Casino U. A Good Bet For Tribes, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
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sometimes divide gaming tribes. 177 Gaming has proven to be a
catalyst for social change as well as for new ideas, which will facilitate
the development of Native American tribes that choose to delve into the
world of gaming. Nine tribes have recently joined together to form an
alliance to push for the expansion of tribal governments and economic
development, and to strengthen laws which require the return of sacred
objects. 178

B.

The Effect of Gaming on Non-Native American Communities

Gaming has also been a catalyst for improvements to surrounding nonNative American communities.
Tribes across California employ
approximately 10,000 people from surrounding communities, both Native
Americans and non-Native-Americans. 179 Native American gaming at
the Barona, Sycuan and Viejas reservations in San Diego County has
created more than 2,800 jobs. 180 In San Bernardino County, the San
Manuel tribe has generated more than 1,200 jobs, making them the
largest private-sector employer in the county. 181 Riverside County is
home to the Cabazon tribe that created more than 580 jobs, making them
one of the county's largest employers. 182 The Santa Ynez casino
generated 350 new jobs in Santa Barbara County, 183 and in Yolo
County, the Rumsey Tribe is the largest employer in Western Yolo
County, employing 520 people. 184 Finally, the Jackson tribe, Amador
County's second-largest employer, created more than 295 jobs. 185
Hand and hand with the new economic force are of course the millions
of dollars in payroll, and the accompanying payroll tax and revenue.

177. Id. at AS.
178. Bill Ainsworth, Indian Tribes Form New Alliance, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
Jan. 21, 1998, at A3 [hereinafter Alliance].
179. CALIFORNIA NEVADA INDIAN GAMING ASSOCIATION, SUMMER 1996
QUARTERLY PUBLICATION, Vol. 1 iss. 1, 2 (1996) (periodical publication which keeps
track of all Native American gaming issues in California and Nevada, and keeps track
of voting records of Congress) [hereinafter CNIGA].
180. Id. at 2.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 3.
184. CN!GA, supra note 179, at 2.
185. Id. at 12.

203

In addition, gaming generates high rates of employment. 186 Native
American individuals pay sales tax, federal income tax, FICA and social
security taxes. 187 "Most Indians also pay state income and property
tax. Only a small percentage of Indians who live and work on federally
recognized reservations ... are exempt from paying state income and
property tax." 188 The San Diego County casinos generate "more than
$42 million in annual payrolls, with another $3 million in payroll
taxes." 189 The San Manuel tribe generates $16.4 million annually in
payroll, which comes out to $2 million in payroll taxes. 190 The
Cabazon tribe has an annual payroll of $12 million. 191 Riverside
County also benefits from the Morongo tribe, which has a $6 million
annual payroll. 192 The Santa Ynez and the Jackson Tribes each bring
in $4 million to their respective counties. 193 In Yolo County, the
Rumsey tribe generated $10 million in payroll and benefits. 194 Along
with employment and salary totals well over $100 million a year in the
State of California, tribes also depend on outside services, and spend
money on non-Native American business and distributors.
Tribes buy products from surrounding businesses, which in tum
creates more jobs, placing more money into the state economy. Between
the seven tribes mentioned above, more than $108 million is spent
annually on goods and services bought from local businesses and
vendors. 195 Three of the tribes alone in San Diego County generate
$64 million of the $108 million, excluding other tribes who have gaming
operations which are not reflected here. 196 The state of California has
decided not to engage in casino gaming, or reap the benefits that may
derive from it. However, this state decision should not hinder tribes
from gaming and in tum adding large amounts of money into the
California economy. Because non-Native Americans cannot open
casinos for the state to tax, the state of California should encourage the

186. Non-Indians working at Native American casinos are taxed by the federal and
state governments as they would be at any job.
187. See supra note 6.
I 88. See supra note 6.
189. CNIGA, supra note 179, at 2.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 3.
193. Id. at 3, 12.
194. CNIGA, supra note I 79, at 3.
195. Id. at 2-12.
196. For illustrative purposes, only a handful of the tribes of California will be
studied. ("Of California's 104 [recognized] tribes, about 40 operate casinos or plan to
open them. These gaming operations, owned by Indians, have turned many impoverished reservations into prosperous enclaves." Ainsworth, Alliance, supra note 178).
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receipt of the financial benefits from allowing tribes to engage in Class
III gaming.
Another benefit derived from prosperous Native American gaming is
the generosity displayed by such tribes through community service. The
seven mentioned tribes alone have decided to donate to many different
organizations which provide needed services to people in their respective
counties. In San Diego County, the Sycuan tribe donates to the San
Diego Arthritis Foundation; the Barona tribe donates to the San Diego
Symphony; and the Viejas tribe donates to local community charitable
organizations. 197 Other tribes have donated to organizations across the
state, and set up scholarship programs for the employees of the
casinos, 198
The above figures are just a small sample of what seven of the forty
tribes who have decided to become involved in casinos in the state of
California can do for the state economy. The tribes have made money
for themselves through gaming, as well as deciding to help other
communities, to which they are not legally obligated. The aboveoutlined donations were made despite the fact that the state government

197. CNIGA, supra note 179, at 2.
198. Id. at 2-3, 12. In addition to donating extensively to the community, the
Cabazon Tribe of Riverside County has built the first employer-sponsored day care
facility in the Palm Springs area for employees of the casino. The Cabazon tribe has also
been responsible for environmental projects, including three separate soil projects, which
will help the local agricultural community. In addition, Riverside County has received
$5 million from the Morongo tribe for supplementing support to local charities like the
American Cancer Society, and underwriting of the local City of Banning's Stagecoach
Days. The Santa Barbara County tribe, the Santa Ynez, contributed financially as well
as in other ways to help the non-Native American population. Their casino employs forty
percent non-Native Americans recruited from state and local job training programs,
attracting national recognition for fair employment policies from the Private Industry
Council, and the Job Training Network. Tribes in California contribute to a very diverse
range of charities and causes, exemplifying their commitment to their surrounding
communities. Another example is the Rumsey tribe which provides assistance to public
safety departments in Yolo County, such as the Volunteer Fire Department, as well as
to cultural and art organizations. Interested in the safety of the community, the tribe has
contributed more than $130,000 to the Yolo County Sheriff's Department alone. The
tribes are interested in the well-being of the next generations as well. The Jackson tribe
has emphasized an interest in youth with over a $100,000 contribution to youth programs
in the community, to organizations such as Boy Scouts and Little League Baseball, and
an $8000 donation given to the local "Say No to Drugs" publication put out by local law
enforcement. The Jackson tribe also holds the elderly in high regard and supports Senior
Center projects. Id.
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has historically made life difficult for the tribes of California. 199 The
time has now come for the state government, the federal government, or
the people of the state of California and other states to initiate helpful
solutions to rectify the history of the Native Americans of this country.200
PART V

THE DISCREPANCY OF THE IGRA WHEN COMPARED TO PRECEDENT,
THE CONSTITUTION AND STATUTORY LAW

Part I above, including the Indian Commissioner's letter, 201 illustrated that the removal process devastated the Native American populations
in the 18OO's. The sections of the United States Constitution 202
explicitly stated and implied that Congress and the federal government
would be the governmental entity to deal with tribes. Furthermore, the
general federal policy towards Native Americans has been to not
interfere with tribal sovereignty. 203 This began with Cherokee v.
Georgia, where the Court made clear that, Native Americans were to be
considered "domestic dependent nations" under the protection of the
federal government. 204 McClanahan v. Arizana State Tax Commission
specified that state law could intrude only if there is no interference with
tribal self-government, and only if non-Native Americans were
involved. 205 In Williams v. Lee, the Court held that state law may
intrude on Native American tribes only where essential tribal relations
were not involved_2Cl6 Public Law 280 essentially allowed states to
interfere with tribal jurisdiction when a law was criminal/prohibitory,
versus civil/regulatory. 207 Most importantly, the California v. Cabazon
decision held that the states could not regulate gaming on Native
American reservations. 208 Cabazon gave Native Americans the power
to conduct gaming on reservations notwithstanding state opinion,

199. See infra Part IV.
200. See generally WALDMAN, supra note 3; JOSEPHY, supra note 4 (discussion of
the history of Native Americans).
20 I. HEIZER supra note 26.
202. See supra note 45.
203. See supra Part II (discussing the relationship and responsibility that the federal
government has with Native American tribes).
204. Cherokee, 30 U.S. I (1831).
205. McClanahan, 411 U.S. 164 (I 973).
206. Williams, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
207. See Public Law 280, supra note 79.
208. Cabazon, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
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apparently making politicians nervous enough that one year later federal
legislation was passed to put the control of what types of games would
be allowed on reservation casinos into the hands of the state governments. 209
Based on federal judicial decisions summarized above and statutory
law, the general intent was to protect Native Americans and their
remaining land from state authority. The federal government wanted the
tribes to become self-sufficient and sovereign, while the federal
government looked over their shoulders as a guardian.
The above cases illustrate that interference by a state government that
affected tribal self-government, 210 or interfered with essential tribal
relations 211 had historically been frowned upon by the courts. Therefore, logic dictates that a state may not now attempt to regulate gambling
on reservations. 212 However, contrary to the general historical intent
to protect the tribes of the United States from the individual states,
Congress passed a piece of inconsistent legislation which seemingly
ignored one-hundred and fifty-six years of case law, and handed over the
economic welfare of Native American tribes to state governments by
allowing the states to have control over whether Native Americans
practiced gaming on Native American land. 213 Much of the past law
points to the conclusion that the role of the federal government is as
guardian of Native Americans. 214 Such cases also conclude that the
federal government may pass laws to give states some regulatory power,
but the case law states that such power be regulatory, and not interfere
with tribal self-sufficiency. 215 The IGRA is interfering with that selfsufficiency for the tribes of California.
The IGRA is inconsistent with past court decisions in allowing states
to interfere with integral tribal relations, and allowing states to regulate

209. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(l)(B) and (C) (1994) (mandating that Class III
gaming be allowed only if located within a state that permits such gaming, and if the
tribe enters into an agreement with the state).
210. McClanahan, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
211. Williams, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
212. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 221.
213. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994).
214. The author recognizes that there is also case law that has allowed the federal
government to infringe on the rights of Native Americans. See generally United States
v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977).
215. McClanahan, 41 I U.S. at 164; Bryan v. Itasca County Minnesota, 426 U.S.
373 (1976).
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gaming, which is a civil/regulatory matter, notwithstanding that the state
allows gaming within its borders. Class III gaming requires that the
states and the tribes form a compact essentially giving a state regulatory
control of whether a tribe can enter into the most profitable class of
gaming, which is completely contrary to the historical relationship
between the state government and the tribes. 216 Congress set forth the
principal goal of the IGRA policy "promoting tribal economic development, tribal self-sufficiency, and strong tribal government." 217 The
Governor of California is refusing to meet this policy by refusing to
compact in good faith with the individual tribes. 218 According to the
Declaration of Policy in the IGRA, its goal is "to provide a statutory
basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of
promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong
tribal governments." 219 The autonomy given to the tribes is contradicted by giving the choice to engage in gaming to state governors who may
have other interests.
The IGRA could benefit tribes, but transferring decisional power to the
states was contradictory to federal law, and the IGRA now needs to be
rectified.
PART VI

SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF ATTEMPTING TO DICTATE
SOVEREIGN NATIONS

The only way to make the IGRA issues disappear is to come up with
some realistic solutions. The solutions here are not entirely original, but
are entirely possible under the power of the federal government, state
governments, and most importantly the citizens that make up the United
States of America, including Native Americans. 220
The first viable solution for the Native American community in the
state of California is amending the California State Constitution, and
allowing Native Americans the freedom to engage in gambling as
sovereign nations. By amending the State Constitution to "allow"
gaming on the reservation, the gaming decision could effectively be
taken out of the hands of one individual, the Governor, and placed in the

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
8 U.S.C.
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See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994).
Id.§ 2702(1).
See supra Part III.
25 u.s.c. § 2702 (1994).
Native Americans born in the United States are United States citizens by birth.
§ 140l(b) (1978).
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hands of the individual tribes. In 1996, Senator Ken Maddy, R-Fresno,
sought a constitutional amendment that would allow electronic gambling
machines on the state's Native American reservations. 221 To write the
provision into the constitution, a two-thirds vote in the legislature and
a vote of the people was needed, bypassing the requirement of the
Governor's signature. 222 Maddy's measure would have legalized
around 12,000 poker and slot-type electronic gaming devices that were
already in use at the state's tribal casinos. 223 The amendment would
have authorized, "but not require[d] [Governor] Wilson to negotiate
compacts with individual tribes to allow the electronic games." 224 At
the time Howard Dickstein, an attorney for several gaming tribes, was
asked whether the tribes agreed with the measure, and he stated that the
tribes generally supported the idea. 225
Two other gaming bills were introduced before Maddy's, and like
Maddy's bill, both have failed. One bill brought by Senator Richard
Polanco, D-Los Angeles, received only four votes short of the two-thirds
majority needed in the Senate, and the other bill was brought by Senator
Jim Battin, R-La Quinta, fell six votes short of a two-thirds majority
needed in the Assembly. 226
Considering the almost successful attempts at amending the Constitution, Senator Polanco has decided to make another attempt. 227 Senator
Polanco's new amendment was introduced on September 13, 1997, and
sought amendment of Section 19 of Article IV of the California
Constitution. 228 This amendment authorizes the establishment and

221. Dan Smith, Maddy: Let Voters to Decide on Indian Gaming, PRESSENTERPRISE, June 21, 1996, at AID.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at A 11.
226. Smith, supra note 22 I, at A 11.
227. Cal. S.C.A. 21 (1997) (amendment to the California Constitution is pending
in the California Senate).
228. Id. Section 19 of Art. IV of the California Constitution now reads,
(a) The Legislature has no power to authorize lotteries and shall prohibit the
sale of lottery tickets in the State.
(b) The Legislature may provide for the regulations of horse races and horse
race meetings and wagering on the results.
(c) Notwithstanding subdivision (a) the Legislature by statute may authorize
cities and counties to provide for bingo games, but only for charitable
purposes.
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operation of casinos on Native American lands located within the state
that are under the jurisdiction of a federally recognized Native American
tribe, by exempting certain gaming activities from specified constitutional restrictions pursuant to the terms of a gaming compact. It would
exempt the tribe and the tribe's activities or facilities from any law
prohibiting gambling or gambling-related activities. 229 The amendment
would also add Article XXII, the Tribal Government Gaming Act of
1998. 230 This measure would still allow the governor to compact with
the tribes. 231
Taking some control out of the Governor's hands is a positive attempt
to benefit the tribes. However, the ideal situation would be a State
Constitutional amendment, or a Federal Constitutional amendment,
which takes all power to decide whether or not tribes will engage in
gaming out of the government's hands, and places that power in the
hands of each individual tribe. A constitutional amendment either to the
California Constitution, or the United States Constitution, could
effectively provide that all decisions pertaining to the self-sufficiency
and self-determination of Native American tribes within the borders of
the United States of America shall be made by the individual tribes in
accordance with their customs and laws, so Jong as those decisions do
not directly conflict with the laws of the United States, as evidenced by
the contemporary national standards. An amendment transferring the
decision-making powers to the tribes would return the sovereignty that
Native Americans had before the state and federal governments
colonized them. A constitutional amendment would enable the tribes to
engage in gambling, as Nevada has so decided.

(d) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), there is authorized the establishment of
a California State Lottery.
(e) The Legislature has no power to authorize, and shall prohibit casinos of
the type currently operating in Nevada and New Jersey.
CAL. CONST. art. IV, sec. (a)-(e).
229. Id.
230. This is how part of the introduced amendment would read if passed:
Art. XXII Tribal Government Gaming Act of 1998:
Sec. I. This article, together with subdivision (f) of Section 19 of Article
IV, shall be known and may be cited as the Tribal Government Gaming
Act of 1998.
Sec. 2. The people of the State of California declare that the purpose of
this Act is to support and preserve the right of federally recognized Indian
tribal governments within California to continue to provide tribal
economic development through the conduct of regulated gaming on Indian
lands, which has been the primary source of jobs and relief from welfare
on California Indian reservations for many years, and to resolve uncertainties regarding the legal status of such gaming.
Cal. S.C.A. 21 (1997).
231.

210

Id.
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The people of the state of California would best effectuate a second
solution to the problem through initiative. 232 The people of California
can place an initiative on the ballot. 233 The initiative for a constitutional amendment could take the same form as the amendment outlined
above. The possibility of an initiative passed by the people in favor of
a constitutional amendment, either put on the ballot by politicians, or by
petition, is not far-fetched. Bipartisan support for allowing Native
American gaming has been present for years in California.
In 1995, a Republican representative from the 75th District of
California, Jan Goldsmith, said that voters support Native American
gambling, and do not want to "wag(e] a new war against American
Indians." 234 Representative Goldsmith stated that "[a] recent survey
uncovered overwhelming public support for tribal gaming, and there's
good reason for it - reservation gaming is good for California." 235
In light of the fact that eighty percent of federal spending to assist tribes
was to be cut at one time, the sentiment has been that reservation
gaming should be encouraged by the state. 236 Refreshingly, Ms.
Goldsmith was able to separate the issue of gaming in the State of
California, and the right of tribes as sovereign nations to operate gaming
on the reservations. 237 She felt, as a representative of the people of the
75th District, that "we need to move through the debate to establish the
legal, regulatory and fiscal framework that will give ... Native
Americans the foundation to continue to operate their tribal-government
gaming facilities unfettered from harassment. " 238 The debate has
attracted not only state representatives, but California Congresspeople in
Washington D.C. as well. Representatives George Miller, D-California,
and the late Sonny Bono, R-California, spoke out against the Justice
Department's decision in April of 1997, which stated that Native
American casino's electronic gambling operations should be shut down,

232. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8 (a) (The initiative is the power of the electors to
propose statutes and amendments to the Constitution and to adopt or reject them).
233. California law requires a petition signed by electors equal in number to eight
percent of the votes for all candidates for Governor at the last gubernatorial election to
place a Constitutional amendment initiative on the ballot. Id. at (b).
234. Goldsmith, supra note 170.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.

211

because they believed that the decision would interfere in the small
amount of negotiations that had taken place. 239
The support of local and statewide politicians is important, but what
is more important is that the people of the United States and California
overwhelmingly support the right of Native Americans to allow gaming
on reservations. 240 A nationwide Harris Poll asking 1,205 adults from
across America, excluding Nevada and New Jersey, their feelings on
casino gambling on Indian reservations, found that more than seventy
percent believed Indian people should be allowed to operate casinos on
the reservations. 241 In 1995, J. Moore Methods Inc. Poll, of Sacramento, found that sixty to seventy-three percent of voters back reservation
casinos, with seventy-five percent backing the continued operation of
gaming on Native American reservations. 242 The J. Moore Methods
Poll exemplified a pattern which had been identified since 1993 when
a poll conducted by Field Research Corporation showed that more than
sixty percent of Californians favored expanding gaming on reservations.243 The above polls not only show what the voters want, but also
what the voters do not want. Fifty-eight percent of voters oppose
Governor Pete Wilson's position of not negotiating gaming compacts
with California tribes. 244
In addition, most voters feel that Native American gaming should not
be restricted by government regulations, which backs an initiative to take
the gaming issue out of state government hands. 245 The people of
California across party lines agree with gaming, and what gaming does
for Native Americans: "Seventy-nine percent of Republican male voters
in California agree tribal government gaming is good .. ," 246 "eightyfive percent of Republican women agree that [Native Americans], not
state government, should be accountable for keeping tribal gaming free
of corruption," 247 and "seventy-three percent of Democratic women

239. David Safford, Lawmakers Question Wisdom of Order to Pull Plug on
Electronic Gambling, LEGI-SLATE NEWS SERVICE, April 21, 1997, at 1.
240. VIEJAS BAND OF KUMEYAAY INDIANS, PRESS INFORMATION PACKET, at Public
Support Section (1997) (describing the tribe and outlining tribal sovereignty, gaming, and
tribal development) (unpublished but copy on file with author).
241. See id.
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. See id.
245. See VIEJAS BAND OF KUMEYAAY INDIAN, supra note 240 (The J. Moore
Methods Inc. survey illustrates that point when seventy percent of voters say that they
think gaming needs no additional government regulations, and more than fifty percent
oppose legislative restrictions on Native American reservation casino gaming).
246. Id.
247. Id.
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voters agree with the use of gaming revenue to improve life on the
reservations," 248 With the widespread support for Native American
gaming on reservations, Attorney General Dan Lungren will probably
think twice about running a Governor's race with the same attitudes Pete
Wilson has shown for the Native Americans, 249 Both Governor Pete
Wilson and State Attorney General Dan Lungren "steadfastly have
refused to negotiate compacts to permit the use of video gambling
machines by Native Americans," 250 Their argument is that state law
does not permit video gambling, and therefore the state does not have to
compact with tribes, 251
The argument appears hypocritical in the eyes of groups supporting
gaming in light of the wide amount of computerized lottery games, and
other state-sponsored games of chance, 252 If the states, under the
IGRA, allow lotteries and parimutuel wagering, casino games, slot
machines electronic facsimiles of games of chance and banking card
games, that state must compac with tribes, 253 Now that Governor
Wilson has signed a compact with a tribe, he is admitting through his
actions that he is not against gambling, just gambling that will generate
substantial income for the Native Americans, 254 If the Governor and
the State Attorney cannot follow federal law in good faith, then the time
has come for the people to enact a law which is easy to follow, gives the
tribes the sovereignty they deserve, and puts all the decision making
tools that the individual tribes need for self-determination back in the
hands of the tribes, In fact, this is exactly what the tribes have decided
to do, 255 An initiative that would permit an unlimited number of slot
machines, pay five to six percent of net winnings into trust funds
earmarked for non-gaming reservations, and give the state thirty days to

248, Id.
249. See Alan Bersin, Resolving the Indian Gaming Problem, SAN DIEGO UNION
TRIB., June 26, 1996, at B7 (discussion of the State of California Native American
gaming issue from the perspective of the United States Attorney for the Southern
District, and the negative sentiments of Pete Wilson and Dan Lungren).
250. Id.
251. See id.
252. See id.
253. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2703, 2710 (1994).
254. See Sweeney & Barfield, supra note 146 (discussing the fact that the machines
Wilson wants to approve are not as fast or as profitable as the existing games).
255. See Sweeney, Alliance Rejection, supra note 151.
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approve any compact from a tribe, was submitted in January. 256 When
asked about the initiative, Mary Ann Andreas, tribal chair of the
Morongo commented that the tribes hope that "the public will see that
not only has tribal sovereignty been trampled on here, but democracy,
which everyone should be concerned with, has been trampled on." 257
If the solutions put forth so far seem too high-minded, then Congress
needs to take control and amend the IGRA to adhere to what history has
dictated, by taking all reference to state power over Native American
sovereignty out of the statute, or by repealing the entire statute and
starting over. Changes to the IGRA have been contemplated since its
conception in 1988, showing a chance for compromise and changes in
the IGRA which would benefit the Native Americans. 258 In 1995,
Senators John McCain, R-Arizona, and Daniel Inouye, D-Hawaii, wanted
to create a stronger, independent federal agency to enforce federal
standards for Native American gaming. 259 The amendment would have
also limited the states' ability to "put up roadblocks to Indian garnbling."260 The amendment would have mandated that if a state refused
to negotiate a compact within 180 days, then the Secretary of the Interior
Department could be asked to end the impasse. 261
President
Gaiashkibos, President of the National Congress of American Indians,
stated that "[ w]e will continue to speak out against any legislation ...
that infringes on tribal sovereignty, but we will also applaud efforts to
provide reasonable measures to ensure the long-term viability and
integrity of Indian gaming." 262 The time has come to speak up against
the IGRA when governors, such as Pete Wilson, refuse to negotiate in
good faith. Given the willingness to amend the IGRA, an amendment
that would bar state involvement in the gaming process of the tribes
seems to be the best solution. An amendment to the IGRA would align

See id.
Id. See James P. Sweeney, Tribes Gather 800,000 Names For Gaming Vote,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr. 21, 1998, at A3.
258. See generally Karen S. McFadden, The Stakes Are Too High to Gamble Away
Tribal Self-Government, Self-Sufficiency, and Economic Development When Amending
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 21 J. CORP. L. 807, 821 (1996) (discussing the
amendment of the Tribal-State Compacting Process); Edward P. Sullivan, Reshuffling the
Deck: Proposed Amendments to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 45 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 1107, 1156 (1995) (discussing positive and negative amendments which had been
discussed up until 1996).
259. See Keith White, Lawmakers Push Indian Gaming Act Amendment: Tribes,
States Haggle, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, June 22, 1995, at 2.
260. Mitchell Zuckoff, Congress to Take Up Changes to Indian-Casino Law,
BOSTON GLOBE, June 22, 1995, at 48.
261. See id.
262. White, supra note 259, at 2.
256.
257.
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it with past federal case law, 263 and allow the tribes to have the
sovereignty to make the decisions effecting their self-sufficiency and
self-government befitting the "findings" section of the IGRA. 264
Another solution that has entered the controversy is a set of guidelines
drafted by the Secretary of the Interior which would let him approve
Native American casinos over the objection of governors and the elected
officials who do not want tribal gaming in their states. 265 The new
guidelines lay out a step-by-step process through which tribes might
apply directly to the Interior Secretary for gaming compacts. Tribes
could pursue that option only after states refuse to negotiate, then refuse
to be sued for it. 266 Secretary Babbitt's reasoning for establishing the
guidelines is to give the tribes a remedy under the IGRA, which was
taken away from them in the U.S. Supreme Court case, Seminole Nation
v. Florida. 267 Tribes have complained that the decision left them no
recourse when states refuse to bargain in good faith. 268 However,
disagreement has come to the forefront as to whether the new guidelines
will necessarily assist the tribes in California. Howard Dickstein, an
attorney for the Pala Band of Native Americans stated that, the "position
[of the Secretary] is very close to the position that was advocated by the
states," and furthermore, while the new guidelines "could get the tribes
a compact, it does not appear that it's going to get tribes a different
scope of gaming, an expanded scope of gaming." 269 Mr. Dickstein's
opinion however, is not shared by all. 270
Mark Nichols, the chief executive officer of the Cabazon Indians of
Indio said that even though Governor Wilson has refused to negotiate a

263. See supra Part 11-B (discussing the history of case law).
264. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994).
265. See Chet Barfield, U.S. Drafts Guidelines for Indian Gambling; Designed to
End Impasse With States, SAN DIEGO UNJON-TRTB., Dec. 23, 1997, at A3.
266. See id.
267. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, (1996) (holding that: (I)
Congress lacked authority under the Indian commerce clause to abrogate the states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity, and (2) the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908)---eleventh amendment of the United States Constitution does not bar federal
actions against state officials for their official actions-----did not apply in light of intricate
remedial provisions of the IGRA).
268. See Barfield, supra note 265.
269. Id.
270. See Mark Henry, State's Gaming Tribes Drafting Alternative Model For
Casino Pact, PRESS-ENTERPRISE, Dec. 23, 1997, at Al2 (Mark Nichols coming to a
different conclusion than Howard Dickstein).
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compact based on his belief that video slot machines are illegal in
California, Nichols feels that the federal government would allow video
gambling in California because of the present existence of the state
lottery which is a form of electronic gaming. 271 Whatever the outcome, the main objective is to create a level playing field for tribes
when states refuse to negotiate. 272 The new guidelines have of course
stirred up some controversy from state representatives who feel that the
state of Nevada may lose money.
Senator Richard Bryan, D-Nevada, has expressed concern for what he
has termed "the floodgates for tribal casinos in California." 273 Senator
Bryan apparently feels that a compact with California tribes would
threaten the Nevada gaming industry. 274 In addition, the Governor of
Nevada feels the same way, calling Babbitt's proposal "disastrous for
Nevada," considering the "fact that California provides a majority of the
Nevada market." 275 The fears of the Nevada Governor are unfounded
to date, since no reports of any negative impact on Nevada gaming from
California tribal gaming have surfaced. 276 In addition, California
should not take into account whether California's moneymaking
endeavors, such as gaming, which economically benefit its citizens, will
adversely effect Nevada's ability to make money.
Secretary Babbitt's concern for the Native Americans comes none too
soon, as California's refusal has also driven tribes to draft their own
version of a casino pact. 277 One such tribally-drafted pact would
require sharing winnings with surrounding communities and police, in
an effort to boost economic growth. 278 The refusal of Governor
Wilson to compact in good faith under the IGRA, and his proposal to
put a statewide cap on the number of gaming devices, has driven the
California tribes to propose their own compact. 279 Something must be
done to allow Native Americans to continue on the road to sovereignty,

271.

272.
273.

See id.
See Barfield, supra note 265, at A4.
Tony Batt, Plan Gives Final OK to Babbitt, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Dec. 6, 1997,

at IA.
274.

275.

See id.
Id.

276. When the comment was written there had been no reports on whether any
negative ramifications from Native American gaming in California had effected the
Nevada gaming industry.
277. See Henry, supra note 270, at A 12.
278. See id.
279.
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and the Secretary and the tribes are taking the initiative, in light of the
refusal of Governor Wilson to negotiate in good faith, 280
The above solutions are just a few that will reinstate tribal control over
the economic issues that the tribes must address to continue on the road
to complete sovereignty, 281
PART VII

CONCLUSION

To enable the Native American people of California to thrive once
again, and to comply with the purpose of the relationship between the
Native American people and the federal government, Native Americans
must be given the opportunity to live as sovereign nations, The IGRA
has not fared well for the tribes in California, or for the state of
California, The IGRA has slowed down the economic development of
California tribes who want to expand, and allowed the Governor of
California to control the future of tribal economics, In addition, the
IGRA is inconsistent with past case law and the Constitution of the
United States, The benefits conferred on Native American communities,
as well as non-Native American communities through Native American
gaming, cannot be ignored, Considering that gaming is positive for the
people of California and for Native American gaming communities, and
considering that the IGRA is inconsistent with past law, the only feasible
legal avenues are for the federal government to either remain a
protective guardian for Native American tribes, or allow the tribes to
have control of all tribal relations as sovereign nations. Similarly, states
also have a choice and could allow the individual tribes within their

280. It is the author's opinion that the Pala compact which was with one small nongaming tribe, which many other tribes disagree with, is not a compact of "good faith".
See supra note I 46 (discussing tribal displeasure with the compacting negotiations).
281. The Ninth Circuit recently decided a case that could effectively deter
Governors from negotiating in bad faith because of a moral dilemma with Class III
gaming by tribes. In United States v. Spokane Tribe of Indians, 139 F. 3d 1297 (9th Cir.
1998), the court held that Class III gaming provisions under the IGRA cannot form the
basis for an injunction against a tribe. The court found that before the lower court can
permit enforcement against a gaming tribe, it must engage in a factual investigation
when there are allegations that the state has engaged in bad faith negotiations, or has
refused to bargain at all.
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states to decide for themselves whether to begin or how to continue
gaming.
Native American people in California deserve a chance to be
economically independent, and develop the communities within the
reservation lands that the Native Americans reserved when the rest of
their lands were taken. It is up to the lawmakers and the people of the
state of California to provide them the autonomy they deserve.
GREGORY ELVINE-KREIS
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